One of the perennial metaphysical problems of philosophy is the problem of free will and determinism. Tying this issue to the previous one about mind-body interaction, dualists are inclined to say that the will is free, since there is a mind separate from the body that is not governed by causal laws. In the contemporary debate over whether the will is free, three distinct positions have been distinguished.

Libertarianism

Libertarianism is the position that you possess free will. It says that no matter what conditions were acting on you when you decided to do some action A, you could have done some other action besides the one you did. Though you chose pistachio ice cream yesterday, you could just as easily have chosen vanilla. Libertarians believe that two arguments support the view that our actions are free. The first is the argument from deliberation. The second is the argument from moral responsibility.

When you deliberate about whether to take one course of action or another, you assume you are free to choose among the alternatives. This experience of having first deliberated and then decided is a very frequent one. The argument from moral responsibility says that you are aware of certain duties and moral responsibilities you have and the guilt you feel at falling short of those duties. You know that you have deadlines to meet, promises to keep, and that a responsibility attaches to their performance. But the only way that you can have such responsibilities is if you have choices. The argument plays out like this:

• If determinism is true and our actions are merely the product of the laws of nature and antecedent states of affairs, then it is not up to you to choose what you do.

• But if it is not up to you to do what you do, you cannot be said to be responsible for what you do.

• So if determinism is true, you are not responsible for what you do.

• But your belief is moral responsibility is self-evident (at least as strong as your belief in universal causality).

• So if you believe that you have moral responsibilities, determinism cannot be accepted.

According to determinism, even our deliberations are the consequences of antecedent causes. If you have deliberated about having a cigar or not having one, you are weighing two desires. You simply end up acting in accord with the strongest desire. You could only have acted differently than you did if an alternative motive had prevailed at the time.

Do you recognize the argument style? It is called a reductio ad absurdum. It goes back to Parmenides and Socrates. Whenever you say, “Let's assume what you say is true and see where it leads” and it leads to an absurd conclusion, then you have defeated the opposing view, as libertarianism has defeated determinism in the previous argument.

Determinism

Determinism is the doctrine that all actions are the inevitable results of prior causes. Put another way, there is no free will. To the libertarian's argument from deliberation, the determinist says that the feeling that you are deliberating freely is an illusory one. The determinist argument runs as follows:

• Actions are the results of (are caused by) beliefs and desires.

• You do not choose your beliefs and desires.

• Beliefs and desires are thrust upon you by the environment in conjunction with innate dispositions.

• Therefore, you do not freely choose your actions, but your actions are generated by the causal processes that form your beliefs and desires.

As regards moral responsibility, the determinist says you may in fact hold yourself and others responsible for their actions, but you have no right to do so. The belief that you are responsible for what you do is just that — a belief only. In order to be responsible for your life you need to be free as a condition of being responsible, but you're not free.

Metaphysical Compatibilism

Metaphysical compatibilism might be better known by the name soft determinism. Philosophers such as David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Walter Stace, and Harry Frankfurt have embraced this position, which argues that both the determinist view that all actions and events are caused and the notion of human responsibility are true. That is, your action of getting behind the wheel of your car after having three drinks is “compatible” with your being responsible for what happens afterward. Hence the name compatibilismhas been given to this theory.

According to Stace, free acts are those that are done voluntarily. If an agent chooses to have a cigar after dinner, then he performs a voluntary act and acts freely. If a man is addicted to the taste of tobacco, then he does not act freely when he smokes. “Acts freely done are those whose immediate causes are psychological states in the agent. Acts not freely done are those whose immediate causes are states of affairs external to the agent,” according to Stace.

This argument could be cast in slightly different terms. We can describe actions as having to do with reasons. If an agent acts according to reasons instead of internal neurotic or external coercive pressures, then that agent acts freely. At the same time, your reasons and beliefs are not things you choose but impulses you find within yourself.

Harry Frankfurt has added to the compatibilist position. In his article “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Frankfurt maintains that conscious beings have what he calls “first-order desires.” But persons, unlike animals and other conscious beings (which he calls “wantons”), are capable of analyzing the second-order desires they have. Persons have the capacity to reflect on their desires and beliefs and form desires and judgments concerning them. For instance, you may want a third cup of coffee (which is a first-order desire), but it is possible that you also may want not to want this (second-order desire), since having too much coffee causes you to have gastritis and be on edge for the rest of the day.

According to Frankfurt, you act freely when the desire on which you act is one with which you identify. By contrast, an addict acts from a desire that he does not want to act upon. So he is not acting freely. If you desire not to drink the coffee and act on that desire, then your desire is effective and is a volition, which is a desire that moves the agent all the way to action.