By mid-1962, Soviet and U.S. relations over Berlin remained unresolved and the successful negotiation of a test ban treaty continued to be elusive. The situation with the Soviet Union remained stagnant, but Kennedy persisted in his belief that a test ban treaty was on the horizon until early August, when CIA director John McCone informed him of the imminent threat of a Soviet-backed weapons buildup in Cuba.

Early Intelligence

The information initially emerged from intelligence gathered from mail intercepted from Cuba. Several letters discussed the arrival of Russian ships carrying military men and unidentifiable objects. It was unclear, but McCone believed that Soviet SA-2s, also known as surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs), were now on Cuban soil.

McCone sent Kennedy a memo on August 13. In it, he stated his belief that the Soviets were doing more than just providing Cuba with the weaponry for defense. McCone was suspicious that the Soviets were in the process of installing ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. This concerned McCone deeply. He knew inter-mediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) stationed in Cuba could easily hit Washington. Nonetheless, McCone was only speculating, and officials in the State and Defense departments quickly disregarded his memo.

While Kennedy didn't know the specifics of Soviet involvement in Cuba, he did learn the Soviet presence in the country was more active than at any other time. In July, thirty Soviet cargo ships docked in Cuba and unloaded troops, military vehicles, and unidentifiable crates. In August, fifty-five more ships arrived. According to the CIA, 5,000 Soviet troops occupied vacated villages. Additional evidence collected from photographs taken from an August 29 spy plane flight over Cuba showed the presence of SAM missile sites and the construction of a launching pad.

Mounting Pressure in Washington

Kennedy hardly had time to absorb the information when Republican senator Kenneth Keating announced in an August 31 congressional speech that Cuba was harboring Soviet missiles. Worse, he put pressure on Kennedy to take action to resolve the situation.

Kennedy was outraged with Keating's public statement. He knew the CIA was responsible for the senator's concise assessment of the situation. More than anything, he was upset that this latest battle with Khrushchev was coming so close to the November congressional elections. Furthermore, he was being cast as a “do-nothing” president, and this forced him to address the Cuba situation publicly.

On September 4, Kennedy issued a press statement he hoped would calm the public. In it, he emphasized that while there was evidence of the presence of Soviet defense missiles and Soviet military technicians, there was no evidence of offensive missiles or the presence of Soviet combat troops. He ended the statement by reiterating the U.S. commitment to preventing Cuba from spreading its ideology “by whatever means may be necessary.” The same day, Robert Kennedy met with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, who assured him the Soviets were helping the Cubans develop defensive technology and had no plans to install offensive weapons.