That night as the president spoke, nearly sixty U.S. warships proceeded toward Cuba, where they prepared to carry out the quarantine plan once the president gave the order. Khrushchev's response was not promising. A resolution seemed far off, and the possibility of a war increased.

Garnering Support for U.S. Policy

With Khrushchev's position clear, Kennedy had just one last hope. He expected the support of the Organization of American States would provide him leverage. Dean Rusk had left for an earlymorning meeting with the group, and he returned in the late afternoon with good news. Members had voted unanimously to condemn the Soviet Union, and they had even supported a resolution for the immediate removal of missiles from Cuba.

The support of the OAS prompted Kennedy to order the blockade to begin the next morning, October 24, at 10:00 A.M. Kennedy wrote to Khrushchev to alert him that the blockade was going to be instituted. He asked that Soviet vessels observe the blockade and stressed his concern that both sides exercise caution.

The U.S.-Soviet Confrontation

The blockade began on October 24, and the situation looked grim. Substantial progress had been made in completing the missile launching sites in Cuba. In addition, Soviet ships large enough to transport missiles were on their way to Cuba with submarine escorts. As the president was being briefed, new intelligence informed him that Soviet ships approaching Cuba had stopped their procession and reversed course. This was promising, but Kennedy knew the crisis was not over.

That night he received word that two Soviet ships were only miles away from the blockade. Bobby Kennedy sat across from him as the two awaited word on the situation; finally, they learned the Soviet ships had stopped advancing toward Cuba.

Kennedy was correct in his assessment that disaster was still near. Late that night, he received a letter from Khrushchev. The chairman was clearly angry. Khrushchev refused to order his ships to observe the blockade or back down when it came to protecting their rights. The chairman insisted Kennedy was out of line in enforcing a quarantine, and he was convinced the United States would respond the same way the Soviets were if their roles were reversed.

Kennedy's response was more concise but no less forceful. The president summarized the events leading up to the present situation. It was Khrushchev, asserted Kennedy, who had made false statements regarding the buildup of offensive weapons in Cuba, and the United States had been forced to act to counter the threat.

The next morning resulted in the passage of two Soviet ships through the quarantine. One was an oil tanker and the other was a passenger ship, and neither was suspected of carrying nuclear weapons. On the president's orders, neither ship was boarded. Even more eventful was Adlai Stevenson's performance at a UN Security Council meeting initiated by Cuba. Stevenson and Soviet ambassador Valerian Zorin exchanged heated words over the existence of offensive weapons in Cuba.

Stevenson presented damning photographic evidence of the presence of offensive missile sites in Cuba, and the Soviet ambassador ineffectively questioned their authenticity. For the rest of the delegates, Stevenson's evidence was convincing.

Khrushchev Seeks a Resolution

Thus far, the quarantine had been effective. Soviet ships with military equipment had reversed course prior to reaching the U.S. quarantine. When Kennedy met with Ex Comm on October 26, the concern had shifted to the continued construction of missile sites in Cuba. The president concluded that if the situation were not resolved within forty-eight hours, a new course of action would have to take effect.

Khrushchev was also working toward a peaceful way out of the situation. KGB agent Aleksandr Fomin approached ABC journalist John Scali. He asked Scali to find out from his contacts at the State Department whether the United States might agree to a deal: the Soviets would dismantle the missile sites as long as the United States promised not to invade Cuba. Word of the deal eventually reached Ex Comm, and Dean Rusk instructed Scali to tell Fomin the United States might consider such a proposal.

It was a hopeful proposition, but Kennedy had every reason not to trust Khrushchev. That night, Kennedy received a rambling letter from the Soviet chairman. The next morning, a revised copy of Khrushchev's letter was published in the press. The second letter demanded an additional concession from the United States: the removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

The new terms confused Kennedy and his advisors, but Kennedy needed to decide on a response quickly. The Joint Chiefs were urging him to order an air strike; Cuban missile sites were almost complete, and that morning an American pilot had been killed when his plane was shot down.

In the end, Bobby Kennedy counseled his brother to ignore the terms of Khruschev's second letter. The president telegrammed Khrushchev that the United States would end the quarantine and promised not to invade Cuba. Kennedy accepted these terms in exchange for the dismantling and removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. Only after this agreement was reached would a discussion ensue over the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

In addition to sending his letter via cable, he sent Bobby to deliver it to Dobrynin. Bobby, under the president's order, informed Dobrynin that failure to accept these terms would lead to military action. In addition Bobby assured Dobrynin that the president was committed to removing the missiles in Turkey after the current crisis was over but warned that this information was not to become public.

Kennedy's proposal got Khrushchev's attention. Less than twenty-four hours later, he accepted the offer. On October 28, American news outlets reported that war with the Soviet Union had been averted. A formal agreement was announced on November 20. Offensive missiles were shipped out of Cuba and Khrushchev agreed to remove all IL-28 aircraft within thirty days. Once again, Kennedy had diverted a crisis with the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev expressed an interest in negotiating with the United States to ensure there would be no more near misses. It brought Kennedy one step closer to his goal of signing a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union.