Approving the Plan
Although Kennedy remained skeptical about an invasion of Cuba, by early March he was forced to make a decision. The exiles forming the Cuban Brigade were ready to proceed, and the CIA received intelligence that the Soviet Union was planning to provide Castro with jet airplanes, which would give Cuba the advantage over the exiles. Once the jets arrived in Cuba, the exiles would need formal U.S. assistance to defeat Castro's forces.
Sorting Out the Details
Kennedy never considered the possibility of U.S. military assistance. More than anything, he wanted to keep his administration's role secret. The original plan called for the invasion to take place in the town of Trinidad in conjunction with a heavy assault from the hills and the air, but Kennedy was concerned it would be impossible to hide America's involvement. Kennedy voiced his doubts at a March 11 meeting with Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, and Richard Bissell, the deputy director. He instructed them to formulate a less grandiose plan and insisted that the attack take place at night and without direct aid from the U.S. military.
A few days later, the CIA presented Kennedy with a new plan. The design proposed the invasion take place at the Bay of Pigs near the Zapata area, 100 miles west of Trinidad. The Zapata area was chosen for its airstrip and the natural resources, such as its swamps, which could provide essential defensive cover during combat. Once the invasion began, the CIA anticipated it would inspire a civil uprising within the country. In fact, the success of the plot depended on it, and Dulles and Bissell estimated a quarter of the Cuban people would back the assault. Again, Kennedy stressed that U.S. military involvement was prohibited. The CIA mistakingly believed Kennedy would certainly send in American troops if the success of the invasion was in jeopardy. Furthermore, even the Cuban Brigade was told that American forces would move in if they were losing the battle. On March 15, Kennedy approved the new plan but insisted that he be able to call it off up to twenty-four hours before it started.
THEY SAID…
“Why had he decided to go ahead? So far as the operation itself was concerned, he felt … that he had successfully pared it down from a grandiose amphibious assault to a mass infiltration. Accepting the CIA assurances about the escape hatch, he supposed that the cost, both military and political, of failure was now reduced to a tolerable level.”
— Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days
Doubting the Plan
Even after approving the plan, Kennedy remained skeptical. Dulles and Bissell continued to reassure him, but when the press began reporting about the recruitment of Cuban exiles in Miami, Florida, and about the planned invasion, it appeared that there was no way he could deny U.S. involvement once the plan was put into action. Furthermore, when journalist Joseph Newman reported about the enthusiastic support Castro enjoyed in Cuba, Kennedy had even more doubts about the predicted uprising. The CIA continued to assure him that a civil revolt would take place, but the reports raised serious concerns.
HE SAID…
“There will not be, under any conditions, an intervention in Cuba by the United States Armed Forces…. I intend to see that we adhere to that principle and as I understand it this administration's attitude is so understood and shared by the anti-Castro exiles from Cuba in this country.”
To top it off, news of the plan had made its way to government officials. Senator William Fulbright, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, heard of the plan and sent Kennedy a memo arguing against the invasion. Fulbright instead suggested that Kennedy implement a policy of containment. Arthur Schlesinger also tried to convince the president not to go ahead with the invasion, but Kennedy had finally come to terms with his decision to push ahead with the plan.
