Providing Aid to South Vietnam
The Eisenhower administration had instituted a policy supporting South Vietnam's campaign against communist North Vietnam, but a South Vietnamese defeat was emerging as a dangerous possibility. Kennedy was committed to Eisenhower's policy, but he wished to avoid sending in U.S. troops, despite suggestions from advisors who insisted that a military intervention could succeed with careful planning.
Supporting a Financial Aid Policy
Kennedy promised enough financial assistance to South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem to expand Diem's army from 170,000 to 200,000 troops. Official estimates in the summer of 1961 noted an alarming increase in the Viet Cong's guerilla forces, but Kennedy's advisors were confident that Diem could hold off the communists with 200,000 troops for the present.
FACT
The Viet Cong, also known as the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, were guerilla troops supported by North Vietnam and their South Vietnamese sympathizers. Their name, which means Vietnamese Communist, was given to them by the Diem regime.
Kennedy preferred that U.S. military forces remain outside of the conflict. He feared that in the end it would turn into a long and drawn-out battle. In addition, on prior occasions he had advocated independence for nations, and to intervene militarily would cast America as a country committed to neocolonialism rather than freedom.
The Taylor Report
In the fall of 1961, General Maxwell Taylor visited Vietnam and issued a report to the president in favor of intervention. The Joint Chiefs, the CIA, and the State and Defense departments supported the plan. It recommended the implementation of an emergency plan; more specifically, it urged the United States to supply military assistance to South Vietnam if the strife continued. It recommended that the United States engage in a limited partnership with South Vietnam. The Vietnamese forces were responsible for defeating the Viet Cong, but U.S. forces could partner with the Vietnamese to instruct them on how to win the war. The report recommended that between 6,000 and 8,000 combat and logistic troops be assigned to the cause. Overall, the Taylor report concluded, the United States must remain present in order to fend off communism and demonstrate America's commitment to halting its spread.
The report's opponents argued that Diem himself was part of the problem and chances for success were slim as long as he remained in power. Diem was significantly unpopular and had already survived one coup attempt in November 1960, and his corruption and repressive measures contributed to the instability within his regime. Taylor's report had touched upon these issues but favored keeping Diem in power in hopes that U.S. influence would convince Diem to make changes in the way he governed.
Agreeing to Send U.S. Advisers to Vietnam
Kennedy still preferred financial aid as opposed to military support. Secretary of State Dean Rusk agreed with Kennedy that it was up to the Vietnamese to fight their own battle, and Kennedy found support from four other allies: Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, economic advisor John Kenneth Galbraith, Undersecretary of State George Ball, and Averell Harriman, the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs. All of them agreed it would be disastrous to send troops. Ball advised Kennedy that doing so would be “a tragic error.”
Nonetheless, Kennedy did not want to risk giving up territory to the communists. At a November 11 meeting, Kennedy emphasized that sending troops was a last resort. In the end, he concluded that sending advisers was the best course of action. The resulting contingency plan called for sending U.S. forces to support the South Vietnamese without joining in direct combat — except in the case of a communist military intervention. On November 15, Kennedy sent a message to Diem committing to a joint effort. The United States promised military equipment and increased personnel and requested that military decisions be made jointly.
HE SAID…
“We have increased our assistance to the government — its logistics; we have not sent combat troops there, although the training missions that we have there have been instructed if they are fired upon to — they would of course fire back, to protect themselves. But we have not sent combat troops in the generally understood sense of the word.”
In theory, Kennedy's plan that U.S. forces remain out of combat could work. However, the reality was that the Vietnamese forces were unequipped to handle the Viet Cong without direct instruction on antiguerrilla combat tactics. American advisers often accompanied Vietnamese forces and even participated in combat. Furthermore, because South Vietnamese pilots were unable to fly the newest types of planes, American pilots often flew them instead.
Denying U.S. Involvement
In spite of Washington's warning to Diem to only give the press routine access regarding military operations, war correspondents quickly realized that American troops were more involved than the White House had let on. On January 12, 1962, American advisers participated in their first combat mission against the Viet Cong. In Operation Chopper, American pilots transported 1,000 South Vietnamese troops to a Viet Cong stronghold near Saigon. The secrecy and the restriction on press access aroused suspicion. Nonetheless, at a press conference on January 15, Kennedy denied that American troops were involved in combat when reporters pressed him.
The presence of 3,500 U.S. troops in Vietnam lent little support to Kennedy's claim. Additionally, combat operations with names like “Sunrise” could hardly hide the fact that U.S. involvement was more than just advisory. These Americanized names were a clear indication to the press that the United States was behind the planning, not the South Vietnamese. American officers were also openly discussing their involvement in planning combat operations. Consequently, the press felt free to report that American participation was not simply continuing but was increasing in magnitude.
